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FREE TRADE BUT NOT FREE TRANSPORT?
THE MEXICAN STAND-OFF t
PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY*
With ninety-five million inhabitants, Mexico became the United
States' second largest trading partner, following only Canada.1 Nearly
$250 billion in trade moves across the border annually, a 191% increase
in the decade following the signing of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).2 In NAFTA's first decade, truck traffic across the
U.S.-Mexico border increased approximately 400%.3 By 2000, trucks
were responsible for transporting an estimated 75% of the goods moved
between the two nations. 4 Five million trucks cross the U.S.-Mexican
border each year.5
A number of legal and regulatory barriers limit operations by
Mexican bus and trucking companies within the United States. With
the exception of cross-border transportation of passengers in charter
and tour bus service, operations have historically been limited to the
commercial zones (defined as a zones extending from three to twenty
miles of a community's limits, depending upon population) of U.S.
t This paper was originally delivered at the Regional Conference of the American Society
of International Law: "NAFTA-Unresolved Issues: Dispute Resolution, Environment,
Labor and Transportation", organized by the International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver College of Law, in the City of Denver, Colorado, March 30, 2001.
* Paul Stephen Dempsey is Professor of Law and Director of the Transportation Law
Program at the University of Denver College of Law. He is also Director of the National
Center for Intermodal Transportation. Dr. Dempsey holds the following degrees: A.B.J.,
J.D., University of Georgia; LL.M., George Washington University; D.C.L., McGill
University.
1. See Eunice Moscoso, The Wheels of Progress: U.S. Roadways Soon Will Be Open to
Trucks, AUsTIN AM. - STATESMAN, Mar. 25, 2001, at Al.
2. See Mexico's Truckers Detoured By Legal, Safety Barriers, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 4,
2001. See generally 19 USC § 3301 et. seq. (North American Free Trade Agreement
effective January 1, 1994).
3. See Alexandra Walker, No Easy Solutions To Mexican Truck Safety Issue, STATES
NEWS SERv., Feb. 22, 2001.
4. See Moscoso, supra note 1, at Al.
5. See NAFTA Trucking Deadline Passes Over U.S. Inspection Concerns, J. COM.,
Mar. 8, 2001, at WF.
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border communities.6 In the commercial zone, Mexican carriers would
deliver trailers to U.S.-based long-haul trucks, which slowed the
movement of goods and increased transportation costs. These
limitations applied to Mexican common carriers, private carriers and to
carriers of both regulated and exempt commodities. Prior to NAFTA,
U.S. carriers were completely banned from operating in Mexico, even
though Mexican carriers were able to operate within U.S. commercial
zones.
As of September 1994, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
issued licenses to 4,666 Mexican motor carriers to operate within the
commercial zones along the U.S.-Mexico border. In fiscal year 1993, for
example, the ICC obtained twenty-eight injunctions against Mexican
carriers performing unauthorized bus or trucking operations in the U.S.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) investigates Mexican carriers
suspected of operating within the U.S. without the required license and
those licensed Mexican carriers that are suspected of operating outside
of the commercial zones.7 The DOT also investigates those carriers that
concealed their Mexican ownership or control when they applied for and
received a license authorizing them to operate in interstate commerce
in the U.S.
Under NATA's terms, which became effective in January 1994,
most restrictions against Mexican carriers operating in the U.S. were to
have been phased out in the 1990s.8 More specifically, NAFTA laid out
a framework under which, beginning December 18, 1995, Mexican
trucking companies were to have been allowed to obtain licenses to
perform cross-border operations into the four U.S. states bordering
Mexico (i.e., California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas), and U.S.
carriers were to have been allowed entry into the six northern border
states of Mexico.9 On January 1, 2000, NAFTA provided cross-border
access for Mexican carriers that engage in foreign commerce only,
throughout the United States. Reciprocal rights were to be granted to
U.S. carriers throughout Mexico. 10 A similar phased-in schedule will
eventually allow full access by Mexican passenger carriers to the U.S.
6. See Leo Abrazzese, ICC Seeks to Expand Commercial Zones, J. COM., Jan. 5,
1988, at 2B.
7. See generally Statement of U.S. Transportation Secretary Supporting the Motor
Carrier Safety Improvement Bill, M2 PREssWIRE, Nov. 22, 1999 (describing improvements
to DOT operations).
8. See NAFTA Will Be Slow to Change the Rules for Transportation Operations and
Ownership, INFO. ACcESS CO., Jan. 1994, at 26. See also Robert Collier, Mexico's Trucks
On Horizon; Long-Distance Haulers are Headed into U.S Once Bush Opens Borders, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 4, 2001, at Al.
9. See Pena Announces Delay in NAFTA Crossings, HAZMAT TRANSP. NEWS, Jan.
1996. See also Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
10. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
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market."
NAFTA also contemplated lifting foreign ownership restrictions. 2
NAFTA provided that on December 18, 1995, Mexican investors were to
be permitted to invest in 100% of a Mexican carrier providing
international service, while U.S. investors were allowed to invest up to
49% in U.S. carriers providing international service." On January 1,
2001, that percentage increased to 51%; complete ownership is to be
permitted in 2004.'
4
The U.S. dutifully implemented those NAFTA provisions allowing
Canadian carriers, vehicles and drivers to operate in the U.S. 15 The
ease of implementation stemmed primarily from the similarity in U.S.
and Canadian truck inspection programs.' However, implementation
of NAFTA provisions relating to Mexican carriers were not as easy. On
December 17, 1995, only one day before the U.S.-Mexican border was
scheduled to open, then-U.S. President Bill Clinton issued a safety
proclamation for unilaterally closing the border to Mexican trucks
beyond the commercial zones, thereby failing to implement NAFTA.
17
The Mexican government responded by placing a similar restriction on
U.S. vehicles.'8
Ostensibly, President Clinton's moratorium was based on safety
considerations. He insisted that Mexican trucks would not be allowed
beyond the commercial zone until the U.S. was satisfied with Mexican
carriers' compliance with U.S. transportation safety laws.2 0  Some
contend, however, that President Clinton's moratorium was imposed
under pressure from the 1.4 million-member International Brotherhood
of Teamsters and the insurance industry.' Mexican drivers earn only
about one-third of the salary of U.S. drivers, and typically drive their
vehicles up to twenty hours per day.' Consequently, many anticipate
that after NAFTA is fully implemented, the trucks hauling most of the
11. See Phyllis F. Scheinberg, Commercial Passenger Vehicles - Safety Inspection of
Commercial Buses and Vans Entering the United States from Mexico, 1997 GAO REP. 97-
194.
12. See NAFTA Will Be Slow to Change the Rules for Transportation Operations and
Ownership, supra note 8, at 26.
13. Id.
14 Id.
15. See Mexico's Truckers Detoured By Legal, Safety Barriers, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 4,
2001.
16. Id.
17. See NAFTA Panel Decision Creates Uproar, LOGISTICS MGMT., Mar. 2001, at 19.
18. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
19. See NAFTA Panel Decision Creates Uproar, supra note 17, at 19.
20. See id.
21. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
22. Id.
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two nations' trade will be driven by Mexican drivers."
President Clinton's suspension of implementation of NAFTA led
the Mexican government to file a formal complaint in 1998 requesting
arbitration under NAFTA's dispute resolution provisions.2 4  The
Mexican government alleged in their complaint that the U.S. was
engaging in protectionism." The U.S. counterclaimed, accusing Mexico
of improper retaliation by sealing off its borders to U.S. carriers.6 The
arbitral process is to take six years to run its course.
While the arbitration panel was being formed, Congress passed the
Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999.27 This Act created the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration within the DOT and
increased the penalties for Mexican carriers operating outside the
21
commercial zones. Under the Act, foreign domiciled carriers must
carry a copy of its registration, and if a vehicle operates beyond the
scope of its registration, it may be placed out-of-service.' The carrier is
liable for a civil penalty and, depending upon whether the violation was
intentional, the carrier may be suspended from operating anywhere in
the U.S. for a period of time.30
On February 6, 2001, the five-member arbitration panel
unanimously concluded that the U.S. decision to block Mexican trucks
from entering the U.S. breached NAFTA, as did its refusal to allow
Mexican companies to invest in U.S. international cargo companies. 3'
With the threat of possible sanctions for non-compliance, the panel gave
the U.S. thirty days to conclude a plan identifying a timetable and
action steps that the U.S. will undertake in accordance with the
arbitration panel's conclusions.2 If negotiations to implement NAFTA
are unsuccessful, Mexico has the right to levy compensatory duties
equal to the economic damage it incurred as a result of the closed
border since 1995.' Some estimate this potential damage amount to be
23. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
24. See Kevin G. Hall, Mexico Turning to Arbitration to Open Border, J. COM., Aug. 5,
1998, at Al (announcing its decision to exercise its Chaprer 20 options under NAFTA).
25. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
26. See Debra Rose, U.S.-Mexican Trucking: Standoff at the Border Continues,
BORDERLINES, June 2000, at 15.
27. See William Buxton, Read: This Act Could Change Your Business, TRANS. &
DISTRIBUTION, Mar. 2000, at 11.
28. See generally Lisa H. Harrington, Trucking Wins A Big One, TRANS. &
DISTRIBUTION, Jan. 2000, at 69.
29. See Statement of U.S. Transportation Secretary Supporting the Motor Carrier
Safety Improvement Bill, M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 22, 1999.
30. See Buxton, supra note 27, at 11.
31. See Daniel McCosh, DOT, Mexico Talk Trucks, J. COM., Mar. 22, 2001, at WP.
32. See Alexandra Walker, No Easy Solutions To Mexican Truck Safety Issues,
STATES NEWS SERV., Feb. 22, 2001.
33. See McCosh, supra note 31, at WP.
VOL. 30:1
FREE TRADE BUT NOT FREE TRANSPORT?
around $200 billion.3
President George W. Bush promised to implement the arbitration
decision expeditiously. As Governor of Texas, Mr. Bush signed a letter
with the governors of Arizona, California, and New Mexico insisting
that, "This transborder trucking delay robs the entire U.S.-Mexico
border region of the full economic benefits that NAFTA promises.""
As noted above, Mexican truck drivers typically drive twenty hours
per day in Mexico." When they crossed the U.S. border, the Mexican
drivers would be subjected to the ten-hour safety requirements with
which the U.S. drivers must comply. 37 However, the Mexican drivers
would not be subject to U.S. labor laws, such as minimum wage
requirements. 8 Concerns remain about U.S. capabilities to police
Mexican vehicles in order to assure that they meet U.S. safety
standards. The primary reason for this concern is the fact that border
crossings are notoriously understaffed.39 The DOT Inspector General
found that while the number of federal border inspectors increased to
from forty persons to sixty persons in 2000, and from a mere seven
persons in 1995, an additional 126 inspectors are needed.0  For
example, California gave full safety inspections to only 2% of the
920,000 short-haul trucks that entered the U.S. from Mexico in 2000.
4
1
In 1999, the Texas Department of Public Safety "inspected only about
1% of the 2.9 million trucks that crossed the U.S.-Texas border..."; half
of these Mexican trucks were turned away for safety and other
violations.'
Though the DOT inspected fewer than 1% of Mexican trucks in
2000, it estimates that 35% of Mexican trucks were put out of service
due to significant safety violations, compared to a U.S. national average
of 25% for 1999 and 34% for 2000. 43 These statistics have improved
however. More than 40% of Mexican trucks that were inspected were
taken out of service in 1997-98, compared with 25% for U.S. trucks and
34. See McCosh, supra note 31, at WP.
35. Steven Greenhouse, Bush to Open Country to Mexican Truckers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
7, 2001, at A12.
36. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Moscoso, supra note 1, at Al.
40. See generally Mexico's Truckers Detoured By Legal, Safety Barriers, TULSA
WORLD, Mar. 4, 2001.
41. See Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
42. Charlene Oldham, U.S. Aid Sought for Truck Inspections, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 6, 2001, at 1D.
43. Mexico's Truckers Detoured By Legal, Safety Barriers, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 4,
2001; See also Unions Aim to Block Trucks, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 2001, at 11_
2001
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17% for Canadian trucks." In 1995, on the other hand, 54% of Mexican
trucks were pulled out of service.45
According to Texas legislator Ciro Rodriguez:
Mexican trucks are held to less stringent safety standards than U.S.
trucks. Unlike American drivers, Mexican drivers do not have to meet
minimal medical qualifications, submit to drug testing, or maintain
logbooks which monitor the length of time they spend behind the
wheel. Additionally, Mexican trucks are older, heavier, and more
likely to transport unmarked toxic or hazardous materials. Overall,
Mexican trucks are reported to have three times as many safety
deficiencies than U.S. trucks and without a standard regulatory
apparatus in place, Mexico has been unable to improve the safety of its
46trucks or enforce a border safety inspection program of its own.
By 2001, some 184 Mexican trucking companies applied to
transport goods in the United States. 7 Applications from 190,000
trucks were waiting to be processed." But several safety issues
required resolution: (1) road sign Standardization; (2) drug and alcohol
testing procedures; (3) medical examinations; (4) safety inspection and
inspector training standards; and (5) completion of a database of
Mexican trucking companies."
The following table summarizes the differences in the regulatory
regimes at the time of the arbitration decision:
TRUCK & DRIVER SAFETY REQUIREMENTS-
SAFETY STANDARDS UNITED STATES MEXICO
Hours of Service 10 hours consecutive No
driving; 15 hours
consecutive duty; up to 8
hours consecutive rest;
maximum 70 hours driving
in 8-days
Licensure 2 to 6 years 10 years
44. Brendan M. Case, Mexican Truckers Challenge Image, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Mar. 7, 2001, at ID.
45. Brenda Rodriguez, Mexican Trucks Have Bumpy Ride in Senate, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 3, 2001.
46. Ciro Rodriguez, Safety on the NAFTA Superhighway, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS
RELEASES, Feb. 17, 2001.
47. See Mexico's Truckers Detoured By Legal, Safety Barriers, supra note 43.
48. Diane Lindquist, Driving Controversy: NAFTA and Mexico's Trucks, COPLEY
NEWS SERV., Feb. 12, 2001.
49. Mexico's Truckers Detoured By Legal, Safety Barriers, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 4,
2001.
50. Collier, supra note 8, at Al.
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Age of Driver 21 years minimum 18 years old
interstate
Skills Test Yes, for all drivers Yes, for new drivers
Medical Card Yes No - medical
qualifications on
license
Automatic Medical Yes No
Disqualification
National Monitoring Yes, to detect violations Information system
System in infancy
Drug Testing Testing and documentation Documentation lax
Logbooks Standardized logbooks with Standardized
date graphs required logbooks in different
format, unenforced
Gross Vehicle Weight 80,000 lbs 135,360 lbs
Limits
Roadside Inspections Yes Discontinued; new
program to be
phased in over two
years
Out-of-Service Rules Yes New program to be
phased in over two
years
Hazmat Regulation Strict standards, training, Covers fewer
licensure and inspections chemicals and
substances, and has
fewer licensure
requirements
Vehicle Standards Standards for antilock Voluntary
brakes, underride guards, inspections
night visibility of vehicle
Safety Rating System Yes No
2001

